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Philosophy in practice? Doctoral struggles with ontology and subjectivity in qualitative 
interviewing. 
 
Abstract 
 
This article presents an auto-ethnographic, narrative account of the struggles we ± as doctoral 
students working in a business school ± experienced navigating the link between research 
philosophy and methodology. We focus on a popular philosophical perspective amongst 
doctoral students: critical realism. In particular, we use an illustrative example of how we 
sought to apply this seemingly abstract philosophical perspective in practice in our 
qualitative interviews, using what we term the ontological whats and epistemological hows. 
Our initial critical realist approach proved inadequate however, prompting us to understand 
qualitative interviewing in more social constructionist terms. Given this, we suggest that 
doctoral students (and researchers) are reflexive and provocative in their use of applying 
research philosophy to methodology. In sharing our experiences, we offer a pedagogical 
contribution for fellow doctoral students and qualitative researchers alike.  
 
Introduction 
 
Encountering research philosophy for the first time as a doctoral student in a business 
school is both a daunting and exciting prospect. The possibilities appear endless, with an 
array of different and competing perspectives to discover and apply to our study of the social 
world. Considering research philosophy, however, is not a task performed in isolation. As 
doctoral students we must adopt a philosophical perspective based not only on our perception 
of the social world but also which, more instrumentally, consistently informs the 
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methodological aspects of our theses. Given that for some (like ourselves) the introduction of 
research philosophy into academic studies is new terrain, difficulties are bound to arise; 
particularly due to the multitude of philosophical perspectives and methods on offer. In this 
paper we contribute an auto-ethnographic narrative account of the struggles we experienced, 
in a style akin to Jones (1995) and MacDonald (2013), in order to suggest that doctoral 
students (and researchers alike) should act reflexively and provocatively in navigating the 
link between philosophical perspectives and their methodological practice. The aim of auto-
ethnographic narratives LVWRµGUDZRQWKHH[SHULHQFHVRIUHVHDUFKHUVLQSDUWLFXODUFRQWH[WVLQ
order to illuminate reflections and foster learning abRXWVRFLDOSKHQRPHQD¶0F'RQDOG
134). That auto-ethnographic accounts allow us to write about our experiences as researchers 
and individuals in the research process, means our experiences are open to interpretation and 
revision as we take those experiences forward in order to theorise from them (Denzin and 
Linclon, 2005; McDonald, 2013). 
We have asked questions that are familiar to fellow doctoral students concerning the 
link between research philosophy and methodology. For example, how important is 
developing a clear, philosophically informed research strategy before conducting our data 
collection? To what extent should the adopted philosophical perspective dictate the design of 
our methodology, and how does one apply research philosophy in the practical moments of 
data collection? Indeed, how can we ensure we remain consistent through to our data analysis 
when interpreting themes in the data? Such concerns are borne out of what Shotter (1999) 
GHVFULEHVDVµDIWHU-the-fact-justificatory-UKHWRULF¶ZKHUHE\GRFWRUDOVWXGHQWVFRQVLGHUµVORWWLQJ
WKH SKLORVRSK\¶ LQWR WKHLU WKHVHV LQ D UHWURVSHFWLYH DQG SHUIXQFWRU\ PDQQHU ZLWKRXW Dn 
LQIRUPHGDZDUHQHVVRIKRZRQH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHPD\LQIOXHQFHUHVHDUFKSULRUWR
data collection. Additionally, we believe there is an assumption that by doctoral students 
understanding a particular theoretical perspective (philosophical or otherwise), the 
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application will follow and be subsequently undertaken with ease (Raelin, 2007; Ramsey, 
2011). 
This paper documents how our attempts to develop a framework informed by critical 
realism was inadequate when practically applied to qualitative interviews, and that an 
understanding of social constructionist principles emerged during the practical stages of data 
collection. The primary aims are three-fold. Initially, our overarching motivation is to explore 
how philosophical perspectives may be applied in the practical moments of data collection. 
Secondly, we aim to illustrate how critical realism offers an attractive proposition, 
particularly to doctoral students engaging with philosophy for the first time, due to its 
RVWHQVLEOHµPLGGOHJURXQG¶VWDWXV:HVXJJHVW, following Brown (2013), that those intending 
to adopt such a position exercise caution when doing so. Lastly, there is a pedagogical 
motivation for fellow doctoral students and those teaching research philosophy to advocate a 
continued reflexivity in one¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO VWDQGSRLQW during the research process. 
Subsequently, we follow Ramsey (2011) in suggesting that the relationship between research 
philosophy and methodology should be used µprovocatively¶. Adopting a given philosophical 
perspective determines the research design and ultimately how the data is interpreted, shaping 
our findings. By reflecting back on the research process, researchers are provided with the 
opportunity to see how their stance influences both the process and findings, enabling us to 
evaluate alternative interpretations of our data and remain open-minded about how we view, 
and research, the social world. 
 Therfore, the structure of this paper follows the logic of our narrative. We begin with 
an overview of our initially adopted philosophical perspective, critical realism. We then go 
on to conceptualise the interview setting, and outline in detail the critical realist informed 
framework that we developed to enact our chosen philosophy during the interview process. 
This is then illustrated with examples from interviews conducted as part of our doctoral 
4 
 
research, before critically reflecting on this process; highlighting the pitfalls in applying 
critical realism, and the requirement for continued reflexivity when applying research 
SKLORVRSK\WRRQH¶VPHWKRGRORJ\ 
 
Philosophical perspective: critical realism 
 
 As doctoral students we recognise that we are exposed to a wide range of competing 
philosophical and methodological perspectives as demonstrated in &XQOLIIH¶VW\SRORJ\
of meta-theoretical problematics within research methodology. The way we make sense of 
and understand these perspectives relates to the specific topic and goals of our doctoral 
research. As such, our discussion here is not to recite all the philosophical possibilities 
available to doctoral students working in a business school, but to offer a consideration of a 
particular perspective that is increasingly common and popular within qualitative 
organisational research: critical realism. We provide a narrative of how we ± as PhD students 
located in a business school ± sought to understand and apply this philosophical perspective 
so as to inform our subsequent methodological decisions. Indeed, we recognise that in any 
type of research (doctoral or otherwise) assumptions about ontology and epistemology are 
vital as how the social world is viewed and studied is unavoidably influenced by these 
assumptions. Moreover, our motivation for pursuing this idea deeper is to consider the extent 
to which philosophy influences our research a priori. Adopting a philosophical perspective 
prior to conducting data collection helps guide us with a theoretical view of the social world 
that necessarily enriches our research endeavours at the point of data collection. Such a 
viewpoint stems from a concern for the tendency of doctoral students to not seriously 
consider the importance of research philosophy from the outset of our studies. This again 
links back to Shotter¶V (1999) notion of µDIWHU-the-fact MXVWLILFDWRU\UKHWRULF¶ZKLFKZHIHHO
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leads to doctoral sWXGHQWVVORWWLQJWKHµSKLORVRSK\¶ into research accounts retrospectively and 
even superficially during or after the data analysis phase. The following discussion is 
presented in a narrative fashion that reflects the contested, journey-like process involved in 
encountering research philosophy during our doctoral studies.  
  
Understanding critical realism  
 The initial starting point in our navigation through the philosophical realm began with 
the discovery of critical realism in our research philosophy training (e.g. Ackroyd and 
Fleetwood, 2000; Bhaskar, 1978; 1979; Sayer, 2004). The use of critical realism in 
qualitative research has become increasingly accepted within organisational and management 
research and within social research in general (Brown, 2013; Brown and Roberts, 2014; 
Maxwell, 2012). Indeed, Brown (2014GHVFULEHVFULWLFDOUHDOLVPDVEHLQJµVHGXFWLYH¶DFURVV
a range of human sciences. Essentially, critical realism seeks to make a distinction between 
our ontological and epistemological understanding of the social world. As such, critical 
realism espouses an ontological realism and epistemological relativism, as introduced by 
Bhaskar (1978; 1979). That is, there is a reality µRXW WKHUH¶ What exists independently of our 
knowledge of it. The only way we can interpret this reality, however, is through our own 
subjective, conceptual schemas. Put simply, critical realism argues that what exists in the 
social world cannot be reduced to what we know about it. Furthermore, critical realism views 
methodological inquiry as the explanation of underlying structures and mechanisms that 
generate powers within subject matter. Therefore, critical realism proposes a layered, 
stratified ontology of the social world containing these structures, mechanisms, and emergent 
powers. Critical realism has also been considered to share an affinity with Marxism ± 
although there are viewpoints for and against this within the debates ± due to its roots in 
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emancipatory politics and dialectical materialism (Benton and Craib, 2011; Brown et al, 
2002); a fuller discussion of which is outside the purview of this paper. 
Now, whilst a simplistic overview of the dense, nuanced field of critical realism, it is 
exhaustive enough to represent our initial introduction with this research philosophy. It is also 
enough to lead us to our next point in which we echo and extend the words of Brown 
(2014:112), and which we believe are particularly poignant in relation to doctoral students: 
Critical realism is seductive. *LYHQRXUH[SHULHQFHFULWLFDO UHDOLVPKDVEHFRPHµVHGXFWLYH¶
precisely because of its ostensible (and workable) centre ground between two opposing poles 
of the philosophical spectrum; extreme positivism and extreme constructionism (Contu and 
Willmott, 2005). Due to its engagement and consideration of both an ontological realism and 
epistemological relativism it appears, in principle, as a research philosophy that is answerable 
to both extremes. Positivism, as it believes in a mind-independent reality, and 
constructionism, in that our understanding of this reality is subjective. Indeed, to borrow a 
further quote from Brown (2014:113), the critical realLVWRQWRORJ\µLVLQWXQHZLWKUDWKHUWKDQ
an affront to, FRPPRQVHQVH¶ [our italics]. Albeit a controversial and contested philosophical 
perspective, the fact remains that the extent to which PhD students in a business school 
engage with research philosophy is often delimited by the amount needed to sufficiently 
address the methodology chapters in our theses. This is compounded by the time constraints 
facing doctoral students who simultaneously seek to engage with large bodies of theoretical 
and empirical literature, collect, and in our case transcribe, significant amounts of data. 
Therefore, we argue that any philosophical perspective or methodological approach that 
presents itself as one that essentially incorporates both ends of the spectrum is - as Bhaskar 
(1989) has described himself - GRLQJDXVHIXO MRERIµSKLORVRSKLFDOXQGHU ODERXULQJ¶IRUXV
These broad tenets of critical realism make it, we argue, an attractive  position for doctoral 
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students to adopt. However, it is exactly these reasons that we believe contribute to both its 
misuse and cursory application.  
Our experience with critical realism as a research philosophy, therefore, also led us to 
further question this initial allure. Whilst its ontological realism/epistemological relativism is 
a generally attractive position, an idea developed from Pawson (2006) ± and discussed in 
Welsh and Dehler (2007) ± VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHLQFOXVLRQRIWKHZRUGµFULWLFDO¶LQLWVWLWOHcan be 
the source of misunderstanding for doctoral students. We believe that XVHRIWKHWHUPµFULWLFDO¶
can be a beguiling tagline due to its suitably radical undertones. By placing the tagline of 
µFULWLFDO¶ RYHU RQH¶V UHVHDUFK philosophy, there is the suggestion that the research seeks to 
engage with the more taken-for-granted aspects of social phenomena from a point of 
substantial critique. Critical realism is then a convenient way in which to proclaim the 
challenging nature of our doctoral research.  
But is thLV KRZ WKH WHUP µFULWLFDO¶ VKRXOG EH understood ZKHQ VSHDNLQJ RI µFULWLFDO
UHDOLVP¶",Qaddressing this point, Pawson (2006:20) also highlights the potential confusion 
RI WKH µFULWLFDO¶ HOHPHQW +H QRWHV WKH FRQWUDVWLQJ LQWHQW LQ %KDVNDU¶V FULWLFDl realism and 
&DPSEHOO¶s (1984), which is described DVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQµULJKWHRXVLQGLJQDWLRQ¶DQG
µRUJDQL]HG VFHSWLFLVP¶ UHVSHFWLYHO\ 3DZVRQ  QRWHV WKDW %KDVNDU¶V FULWLFDOLW\ VWHPV
IURP WKH DQDO\VWV¶ UHVHDUFKHUV¶) privileged and sophisticated understanding of the social 
FRQGLWLRQ ZKHUHDV &DPSEHOO¶s suggests that criticism is something that scientists 
UHVHDUFKHUV DSSO\ WR HDFK RWKHU WKURXJK D SURFHVV RI µFRQVWDQW IRFXVHG GLVSXWDWLRQ
DWWHQGLQJWRHDFKRWKHU¶VDUJXPHQWVDQGLOOXVWUDWLRQVPXWXDOO\PRQLWRULQJDQGµNHHSLQJHDFK
RWKHU KRQHVW¶ XQWLO VRPH ZRUNLQJ FRQVHQVXV HPHUJHG¶ 3DZVRQ  Whilst this is a 
technical debate related to definitional aspects of critical realism, it is an important difference 
to highlight. That is, the way doctoral students approach critical realism does not appear to 
fall into either of these two camps, given our earlier discussion around the reasons for its 
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adoption that is simply based on a critical approach to taken-for-granted aspects of the social 
world (Welsh and Dehler, 2007). Therefore, the concern that presented itself to us was 
ZKHWKHUE\WDNLQJDFULWLFDOUHDOLVWSRVLWLRQLQRXUUHVHDUFKZHUHZHDFWXDOO\EHLQJµFULWLFDO¶" 
 
Our narrative of connecting research philosophy and qualitative interviewing 
 
 Undoubtedly, qualitative interviewing is one of the most prominent and utilised 
research methods at all levels of research, from doctoral study and beyond. The method is 
viewed across a range of philosophical spectrums, from positivism to extreme 
constructionism. For example, positivism understands the interview method in a structured, 
VWDQGDUGLVHGIDVKLRQLQRUGHUWRHOLFLWµIDFWV¶DERXWWKHVRFLDOZRUOGWKDWDUHDFFXUDWHUHOLDEOH
and valid (Silverman, 2011). Alternatively, constructionist approaches to interviewing reject 
this, prioritising the interactional element of the interview through an intersubjective and 
UHIOH[LYH H[FKDQJH ZLWK µSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ 7KLV LV RQO\ DFKLHYHG KRZHYHU WKURXJK D FR-
constructed, collaborative, and meaning-making process between interviewer and interviewee 
(Cunliffe, 2011). Given the focus on critical realism, this section discusses our earlier 
question: is WKHUH D FRQFUHWH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK µWR EH¶ FULWLFDO UHDOLVW LQ LQWHUYLHZ UHVHDUFK" ,Q
order to begin to address these questions we needed to understand whether developing a 
philosophical approach is an idea that works a priori to conducting interview research and 
can be enacted in situ during the interview setting.  
 Drawing on our personal experience of approaching the connection between 
research philosophy and methodological practice, our auto-ethnographic account offers an 
application and analysis of a particular method adopted from Holstein and Gubrium (1995; 
2011). These authors suggest that this approach helps researchers understand the whats and 
the hows of the interview process. Indeed, as Welsh and Dehler (2007) note, these whats and 
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hows are inextricably bound within the critical realist approach. That is, we must consider 
both the substantive and constructed aspects of the interview experience. Holstein and 
*XEULXP¶V method is analysed through our narrative in relation to how we felt it could be 
applied to critical realism, as it is argued that by linking a philosophical perspective to a 
conceptual framework (like Holstein and Gubrium) before conducting our research, we may 
necessarily enrich both our research experience and also augment the data we collect. This is 
an important pedagogical discussion for how PhD students (and researchers more generally) 
can more readily explicate the connection between research philosophy and methodology in 
order to inform the decisions they make in their research design. 
 
Conceptualising the interview 
 As stated by Rapley (2004:15), interviews generally involve a practical situation 
where researchers and respoQGHQWVZLOOµVLWGRZQDQGWDONDERXWDVSHFLILFWRSLF¶ in order to 
HOLFLW IDFWV DWWLWXGHV SHUFHSWLRQV DQG YLHZSRLQWV RQ WKH µUHDOLW\¶ RI WKH VSHFLILF WRSLF LQ
question. In most cases for PhD students, this topic is their specific doctoral research. Now, 
the interviewing method was not historically considered a theoretical problem (Alvesson, 
2003; Maseide, 1990; Pawson, 1996). As Maseide (1990) highlights in his work on 
VRFLRORJLFDO PHWKRGRORJ\ WKH QRWLRQ RI µUHDOLW\¶ ZDV JLYHQ WR EH µRXW WKHUH¶ DQG LW ZDV D
matter of using the most precise, unbiased and objective means possible to extract 
information on this hidden reality; a position indicative of a traditional positivist approach. 
The work by Maseide (1990), however, acts more as a proponent for the rise of social 
constructionist trends in interview research as it represented a shift away from the historical 
traditions of positivistic interviewing. This is the moment in interview research where ideas 
VXFK DV HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ VXEMHFWLYH H[SHULHQFH UHIOH[LYLW\ Dnd issues of 
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representation began to enter and pave the way for more nuanced social constructionist 
approaches to interviewing (Alvesson, 2003; Borer & Fontana, 2012; Cunliffe, 2008).  
This discussion highlights that the introduction of more theoretically-informed 
interview research has created a complex and challenging role for research philosophy (and 
doctoral students). Interview research has become, as suggested by Maseide (1990) and 
Pawson (1996), a theoretical issue. These concerns have arisen out of what form of 
ontological status we can ascribe to the interview setting and to what extent we should 
privilege and SULRULWLVH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ VXEMHFWLYLW\ LQ WKH SURFHVV 7KHUHIRUH contemporary 
doctoral study requires a consideration of these ideas prior to conducting our research. But 
which research philosophy to choose and how to apply it during our interview research, as 
opposed to a perfunctory post-hoc philosophical analysis? Such a question is largely 
GHSHQGHQW XSRQ WKH QDWXUH RI RQH¶V UHVHDUFK DQG WKH DUHD RI VWXG\ XQGHU LQYHVWLJDWLRQ ,Q
seeking to address the connection between philosophy and interviewing, we adapt the work 
by Holstein and Gubrium (1995; 2011) and also Miller and Glassner (2011), who propose an 
anti-GXDOLVWLFVWDQFHWRZDUGVILQGLQJµUHDOLW\¶LQLQWHUYLHZUHVHDUFK7KHQRWLRQRIEHLQJµDQWL-
GXDOLVWLF¶LVDUJXDEO\DVXLWDEO\DWWUDFWLYHSRVLWLRQIRr doctoral students (and indeed, it was 
for us) to adopt because it proposes an engagement with important theoretical aspects from 
the both ends of the philosophical spectrum (positivism-constructionism). Next, we consider 
this approach further and its implications for our philosophical outlook (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2011; Miller and Glassner, 2011).  
 
Methodology: the whats, the hows, and critical realism 
 7KH EDVLF LGHD RI +ROVWHLQ DQG *XEULXP¶V   approach is to create an 
interview setting that is active and animated, in opposition to one that based on any 
foundational or gold standard of interview practice. In order to do this, the authors suggest 
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two communicative contingencies that shape interview activity; the whats and the hows of the 
interview. The whats refer to the substantive focus of the interview, described here as the 
specific doctoral topic being researched. For example, our doctoral research considers the 
impact public sector redundancy has on familial (gender) roles and as a result, any interview 
conversation is based around discussing this topic and related to our specific research 
questions. Then, the hows relate to the more constructed aspects of the interview, that is, the 
way people¶V experiences, perceptions and meanings continually develop within the 
interactivity of the interview setting. To follow our doctoral research, conceptions of gender 
differ depending on how respondents understand and reorient their familial roles given the 
relationship with the interviewer. Furthermore, the hows emphasise the interactional element 
of the interview, including; the trajectory of the talk and the conversation, the co-construction 
of narratives, and the way respondents express the content under investigation (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995; 2011). In order to provide a more nuanced account as to how their method 
may be conceptualised, Miller and Glassner (2011) offer an implicitly similar position. Here, 
the importance of the contextual, situational (hows) nature of interview is the key to 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RXU UHVSRQGHQWV¶ Hxperiences of the social world. What we learn about our 
respondents during this interview process therefore presents us with what Miller and Glassner 
describe as DµFXOWXUDOIUDPH¶whats), which extends to a µUHDOLW\¶beyond the context of the 
interview setting (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; 2011). Thus, we are not simply concerned 
with the content of what is being said in the interview but also the nature of the interaction; as 
it is the combination of the whats and the hows that provide the cultural frame by which 
people make sense of their experiences. At face value, this method was initially extremely 
appealing due to an ostensible resonance with a critical realist philosophy. Had we found an 
interview method that linked our philosophy and methodology in a consistent fashion? In 
order to assess whether this was the case, we must clarify our proposed link between Holstein 
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and Gubrium (1995; 2011), Miller and Glassner (2011) and critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978; 
1979).  
 Given our discussion of critical realism, the composition of the whats and the hows 
was an appealing prospect in applying our philosophical criteria (Edwards et al, 2014). In 
essence, the interview method is viewed as a dynamic relation between what we term the 
ontological whats and the epistemological hows. We propose that, in principle, this is similar 
to the basic idea of critical realism, which advocates ontological realism and epistemological 
relativism (Bhaskar, 1978; 1979). In both instances (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; 2011; 
Miller and Glassner, 2011) there appears a concerted effort to distinguish between ontology 
and epistemology so as to generate greater insight from the interview. Therefore, through a 
distinct understanding of the substantive content under investigation (ontological) and how 
the interaction with the interviewee generates knowledge (epistemological), we formulated 
our interviews and data collection in accordance with this perspective. For example, we 
sought a balance between conversations related to the reality beyond the interview setting ± 
i.e. the specific research topic ± and also the ways in which respondents experientially locate 
themselves in relation to this reality through the interaction of the interview setting.  
We argue that because critical realism splits the ontological and epistemological, any 
application of these criteria to an interview method would necessarily require a similar 
distinction to be made. This is a point echoed by Smith and Deemer (2000:880), who suggest 
WKDWµDQ\HODERUDWLRQRIFULWHULDPXVWWDNHSODFHZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHLU>FULWLFDOUHDOLVWV¶@
commitment to ontological realism on the one side and, on the other, their realization that 
WKH\DUHREOLJDWHGWRDFFHSWDFRQVWUXFWLYLVWHSLVWHPRORJ\¶7KXVLWVHHPVUHDVRQDEOHWKDWLI
we apply a philosophical perspective ± such as critical realism ± to qualitative interviewing in 
an a priori manner, then our endeavours to do so should be consistent and coherent with the 
basic principles that underlie that philosophy (Smith and Elger, 2014). As PhD students, 
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therefore, we felt we could take relative solace in that both our philosophical view on the 
social world and the way we plan to research this social world were, in principle at least, and 
perhaps naively so, theoretically sound.  
 A point must be made in relation to 0LOOHU DQG *ODVVQHU¶V  DQWL-dualistic 
position and the understanding of critical realism more generally. As outlined by Miller and 
Glassner (2011), the anti-GXDOLVWLF DSSURDFK UHMHFWV WKHQHHG WRSODFHRQH¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDl 
practice at either end of the philosophical spectrum. That Miller and Glassner (2011:132) are 
LGHQWLI\LQJ D PHWKRGRORJLFDO SRVLWLRQ µWKDW LV RXWVLGH RI WKLV >WKH@ REMHFWLYLVW-constructivist 
continuum yet takes seriously the goals and critiques of researcKHUV DW ERWK RI LWV SROHV¶
suggests that there is a way out of this philosophical quagmire by placing ourselves right in 
the middle of it. Put simply, the idea of a philosophy, method or methodology that avails 
itself from a specific commitment to either end of the philosophical spectrum is an attractive 
prospect for (business school) doctoral students. This is a point that relates back to our 
SURSRVHGUHDVRQLQJIRUFULWLFDOUHDOLVP¶VSRSXODULW\The reason we believe our position to be 
anti-dualistic ± using the concept from Miller and Glassner (2011) ± is because critical 
realism presents itself to doctoral students as this; a way in which to borrow and merge 
aspects of positivism (such as ontological reality) and constructionism (such as 
epistemological relativism) in one philosophical perspective. We did, however, fall foul to 
such arguments. Therefore, we reiterate that critical realism is seductive precisely because of 
this occupation of the middle ground. By considering the anti-dualistic stance of Miller and 
Glassner (2011) one may suggest we acted in a (typically) critical realist fashion and adopted 
a position that, in essence, sought to recognise and reconcile two opposing ends of the 
philosophical spectrum. 
 
Applying our method: an illustrative example 
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We will now illustrate our efforts in seeking to align these philosophical and 
methodological decisions in practice. Here we continue our narrative account of how we have 
navigated this philosophical terrain and include examples from interview transcripts to 
illustrate our argument. This is a purposeful decision, as in fact ± as is discussed ± there 
appeared to be a discord in how we initially conceived of our philosophically-informed 
interview and how it worked in practice. 
As part of our doctoral research we conducted qualitative interviews with married, 
dual-earner couples affected by public sector UHGXQGDQF\LQWKH8.¶Vpost-recession period 
of austerity. The objective of our doctoral research is to explicate how individuals adapt and 
manage their identities over the course of familial (gender) role change; for example, from 
dual-breadwinning status to that of unemployed primary care-giver. We were thus principally 
concerned with the content of LQGLYLGXDOV¶accounts, in order to ascertain their responses to 
role change and to gain an insight into their perceptions of these role and identity changes. 
Applying our modified critical realist approach, the Holstein and Gubrium (1995; 2011) and 
Miller and Glassner (2011) conceptual frameworks outlined previously offered us a way to 
address our research questions, which involved an understanding of the whats from our 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ FRQVWUXFWLRQV RI UHDOLW\ ,Q DLPLQJ WR EH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH relativist 
epistemology we identified that the locally produced nature of knowledge constituting 
respondent accounts became a key feature of each interaction and subsequent data generation. 
Our attempts to uphold the principles underpinning these adopted frameworks began 
with the design of our interviews. Questions were formulated in a way that we believed 
suitably addressed both the ontological and epistemological concerns of this critical realist 
informed research strategy. For example, asking redundant male interviewees µHow do you 
define your familial role as an unemployed father?¶ VRXJKW WR HQFRXUDJH UHVSRQGHQWV WR
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DFWLYHO\ PDNH VHQVH RI WKH FDWHJRU\ µIDWKHU¶ VSHFLILFDOO\ in the context of unemployment. 
Therefore, meaning-making was communicated verbally as respondents engaged with the 
particular necessities of each probe. 5HVSRQVHV ZH UHFHLYHG VXFK DV µI understand the 
IDWKHU¶V UROH WR EH«¶ RU µUnemployment is at odds with how society typically defines 
IDWKHUKRRG«¶JUDQWHGDFFHVV WRhow interviewees attributed meaning to these categories as 
well as offering the substantive data specific to our research aims, i.e. how they defined their 
role within the family on a more personal level. In the initial stages of this process, the 
interview design was an effective mechanism through which our abstract philosophical 
concepts could bear fruit in the practical stages of data collection.  
As a result the hows - the interactional aspects of knowledge production and reality 
construction - were explicitly significant features of data generation. This is demonstrated by 
the following extract from one redundant male respondent: 
 
µ6LQFH ORVLQJ KRXUV DW ZRUN SDLG KRXUV , PHDQ ,¶YH EHHQ KHOSLQJ out a lot 
more at home. Helping out sounds bad, that makes it sound like the housework 
is [SDUWQHU¶V] job. I have no idea why I have that mind-set RU ZK\ ,¶P QRW
GRLQJWKHOLRQ¶VVKDUHDWWKHPRPHQW2KGHDU¶ 
 
Here we were granted a privileged position into the subjectivity and meaning-making 
practices of this individual. Being asked to explain his share of the division of labour, this 
respondent was encouraged to reflect on why he engaged in a disproportionately lower share 
of both paid and unpaid work, which ultimately fed into social norms surrounding the 
expectations of each gender that had thus far remained unquestioned. 
This sense-making process was particularly evident in our interviews as attitudes 
towards gender roles and gender-appropriate behaviour are often taken-for-granted; even the 
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practical conduct of partners regarding shares of unpaid work (including caring and 
housework) were undertaken in an unreflexive manner. The process whereby respondents 
themselves appear to discover new meanings in what they experience and as life experiences 
are reflected upon, made sense of, and ordered into a coherent whole is a crucial element of 
meaningful data generation (Kvale, 1996). Themes that commonly emerged in the interviews 
VXFK DV µEUHDGZLQQHU¶ DQG µSULPDU\VHFRQGDU\ HDUQHU¶ ZHUH VHHPLQJO\ DFFRUGHG DQ
ontological status by our respondents that did not require elaboration - with their routine use 
presupposing that we researchers had a shared understanding of what each category meant. 
The unproblematic use of these categories was understood through application of the Miller 
and Glassner (201QRWLRQRIDµFXOWXUDOIUDPH¶ The cultural frame reflected the ontological 
aspect within the interview ± despite being locally and collaboratively produced ± and offered 
a representative account of their social realities outside of our interaction during the 
interviews. Indeed, we were concerned with the question of how we as researchers can 
confidently ascertain that the whats recorded in our interviews really do reflect the concepts, 
PHDQLQJV DQG µWKHRULHV¶ SDUWLFLSDQWVXVH WR DFFRXQW IRUZKDW JRHVRQ LQ WKHLU VRFLDO UHDOLW\
outside of the interview. Consider a further illustrative example. 
For the interviewed husbands sharing breadwinning responsibility with their wives 
prior to and following redundancy, their familial roles (as husbands and fathers) were not 
defined by primary earner status within the household. Partners offered complementary 
perspectives on this by ofWHQGUDZLQJXSRQWKHZLGHUFXOWXUDOIUDPHRIµPDVFXOLQLW\¶ZKHUH
breadwinning has traditionally been considered as central to the male familial role; 
 
µ7REHKRQHVWQRWEHLQJ WKHPDLQ LQFRPHSURYLGHUKDVQ¶WEHHQDSULQFLSDOFRQFHUQ
for us, because KH¶s nRWUHDOO\\RXUPDFKLVPRW\SH¶.  
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By situating a male partner within thiV FXOWXUDO IUDPH RI µPDFKLVPR¶ - yet outside of the 
cultural frame in that they do not fulfil its ostensibly ontological criteria - ZLYHV¶ were able to 
make sense of how their husbands managed role and identity change. Through descriptions of 
WKHLUKXVEDQGVDV OHVVFRQFHUQHGZLWKEHLQJ WKHIDPLO\¶VSULPDU\HDUQHUDQGPRUH OLNHO\ WR
engage in types of activities PRUH W\SLFDOO\ FRQVLGHUHG WR EH µIHPLQLQH¶ KRXVHZRUN
childcare), these cultural frames were used as a reference for meaning-making in the 
interviews. These responses also indicate an assumption by interviewees that we researchers, 
as members of a shared reality in which masculinity is often perceived to be determined by 
factors such as earning power and status, understand this referential frame. An alternative 
meaning has thus been co-produced locally within the interview whilst also reflecting a 
reality external to the interactional setting in which these cultural frames make sense. 
We found the practical application of philosophy to our research methodology to be 
an ongoing, iterative process that continued beyond the research design stage and throughout 
WKH LQWHUYLHZV WKHPVHOYHV 8QGRXEWHGO\ WKH µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO UHODWLYLVP¶ RI critical realism 
was a key feature of our qualitative interviews. It was during the actual conduct at the 
interview stage, though, that we began to apprehend the overbearing constructionist influence 
in our interviews and question the relative effectiveness of the philosophical perspective for 
our research. We have illustrated using the Holstein and Gubrium (1995; 2011) and Miller 
and Glassner (2011) frameworks how respondents made sense of their realities in the 
interviews (indeed because of the interviews in some cases) and this was considered 
alongside what was reported in respondent accounts. In these instances we felt that what was 
reported, and how reality was made sense of, were both part of an integrated, simultaneous 
process and separable only analytically.  
Put simply, respondents were seemingly constructing their realities through our 
interaction. This appeared to us as incompatible with the philosophical separation purported 
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by critical realism whereby a realist, stratified ontology exists independently of the 
epistemological relativism that attempts to understand and describe it. In fact, our views were 
DOLJQLQJ ZLWK D SRVLWLRQ WKDW %KDVNDU¶V FULWLFDO UHDOLVP ZRXOG FRQVLGHU WR IDOO foul of the 
µHSLVWHPLFIDOODF\¶RULQWKLV context specifically, tKHµOLQJXLVWLFIDOODF\¶%KDVNDU
Elder Vass, 2012). That is, by asserting that respondents actively construct social reality in 
their collaboratively produced accounts during the interview, the accusation would stand that 
ontology (what exists) is being reduced to a subjective, dialogical account of this world. 
3HUKDSVWKHQLWZDVSUHFLVHO\WKHDFFHSWDQFHRIVXFKDµIDOODF\¶WKDWDOORZHGus to generate a 
deeper, alternative insight.  
Returning to the above example of the µmachismo¶ cultural frame, it was not wholly 
FRPSUHKHQVLEOHWKDWWKHPHDQLQJRIµPDFKLVPR¶FKDQJHGRQO\LQWKHLQWHUYLHZDQGWKDWWKH
concept itself retained a more FRQVLVWHQW µLGHQWLW\¶ LQ the ostensible external reality. 
Philosophically, one of the more illuminating aspects of our research has been the (apparently) 
changing ontological status of concepts such as those in the examples from our interviews; 
for example masculinity and breadwinning. Given that our research was longitudinal, 
respondents appeared to have adopted new roles and managed changes in their identities over 
time. Therefore, it is clear that concepts initially perceived to be fixed have been 
acknowledged as dynamic in nature, and in some cases as a direct result of the constructionist 
influence in the interview process. For example, in our research a redundant male respondent 
who has adopted the role of primary carer for his children and had stopped looking for work 
certainly demonstrated a shift in the meaning he attached to the role of fatherhood; 
 
µ,¶PILQGLQJLWGLIILFXOWDWWKHPRPHQW$VDIDPLO\PDQ\RXZDQWWRSURYLGHIRU\RXU
family, and being out of work effectively stops you from being able to do this¶ (First 
interview). 
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µI feel that the kids benefit from me caring for them as opposed to using a child 
minder7KH\JHWIURPPHDQHPRWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWWKDWVRPHRQHHOVHFDQ¶WSURYLGH
,W¶V LPSRUWDQW WKH\ NQRZ WKDW GDG LV DURXQG DQG QRW MXVW WR SXW FORWKHV RQ WKHLU
backs (Second interview). 
 
It is clear in the first interview that this individual considered providing for the family in a 
SXUHO\ILQDQFLDOVHQVHZLWKSDLGHPSOR\PHQWDFHQWUDOIXQFWLRQRIEHLQJDµIDPLO\PDQ¶%\
the second interview his conception of fatherhood has changed dramatically ± indicating that 
the meanings attributed to fatherhood and his identity as a father were renegotiated socially in 
interaction with others (ourselves as researchers included) and prevalent cultural norms. This 
conclusion differs from one that may have been drawn from our original critical realist 
informed position where the cultural frame itself would not be seen to change (granted by its 
ontological status), rather it would be seen to have helped us and our respondents understand 
changes in, and the different dispositions to, this frame.  
During our practical application of philosophy to the interview process there had been 
a conflation of a constructionist perspective with our initial critical realist informed 
conceptual framework (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011; Miller and Glassner, 2011). Ultimately 
we found that our qualitative interviews were more effectively informed by social 
constructionist principles. Certainly qualitative interviews are conducive to the social 
FRQVWUXFWLRQLVWSHUVSHFWLYHLQWKDWRQWRORJLFDOO\SHRSOH¶VNQRZOHGJHYLHZVXQGHUVWDQGLQJV
interpretations, experiences and interactions are meaningful properties of social reality. There 
is a clear and coherent link here with epistemology in that a legitimate means of generating 
meaningful data on these ontological properties is to talk interactively with people and hear 
their accounts. Through our practical engagement with interview respondents we found the 
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subjectivity and meaning-making processes characterising their accounts to be more 
consistent with constructionist principles. 
In a sense, our original aim for research philosophy to inform our methodology from 
the outset of the research was not wholly realised. It is of interest to note that our wish to 
avoid the retrospective inclusion of philosophical analysis in the methodology chapter of our 
theses following data collection could potentially have led to a different proposition. That is, 
had we not made a consistent and concerted effort to be reflexive and considerate towards the 
practical application of philosophy to our interview research we may have persevered with 
the initial critical realist informed approach and subsequently our methods may have 
µFRQVWUXFWHG¶WKHGDWDGLIIHUHQWO\7KLVZHKRSHKLJKOLJKWVQRW MXVW WKHGLIILFXOWLHVEXWalso 
the requirement for reflexivity and re-evaluation RIRQH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOVWDQGSRLQWLQERWKWKH
research design and data collection VWDJHVRIDQ\GRFWRUDOVWXGHQWV¶µMRXUQH\¶ 
 
Further reflections: towards social constructionism? 
 Here we offer further reflections on the development and application of our 
philosophically informed interview method in practice. What was most striking about 
enacting the adapted critical realist method (Bhaskar, 1978; 1979; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995; 
2011; Miller and Glassner, 2011) is the amount of extra and somewhat unnatural pretence it 
brought to the interview setting. Although the interview is, in many senses, an unnatural 
setting itself ± two (or more) people sitting in a room, speaking about their lives or a specific 
topic ± applying critical realism meant the approach was rigid as we tried to consistently 
honour the abstract method we formulated previously. That is, because we followed a critical 
realist criterion by asking questions related to an ontological reality whilst also aiming to be 
cognisant of the way our respondents construct their subjectivity in relation to this reality, we 
relied on the ability of our interview technique to generate and perform a lot of the work for 
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us (Smith and Deemer, 2000). In order to develop this idea further, we draw on two criticisms 
from our experience and the previous illustrative example that we feel were more suggestive 
of a social constructionist approach to interviewing.  
 Firstly, by approaching and enacting the interview in a way that essentially 
bifurcates the interview experience we lost sight of the overall immediacy and simultaneity of 
the interview experience. 7KHUHZDVDVHQVHWKDWE\µEHLQJ¶DFULWLFDOUHDOLVWLQWHUYLHZHUZH
were effectively, metaphorically speaking, aiming to take ourselves out of the interview 
situation and observe and conduct the interview from an external position. In constantly 
attempting to distinguish and order our own questions and responses so as to account for both 
the whats and the hows we sought to command the interview from an objective viewpoint, as 
we were primarily concerned with satisfying some external UHIHUHQWWRWKHµUHDOLW\¶RXWVLGHRI
the interview setting (Smith and Deemer, 2000). Of course, seeking to answer research 
questions is an obvious demand of doctoral study. Our argument here, however, is that the 
perceived notion of an anti-dualistic stance is in practice problematic as in our experience it 
privileged the external ontological reality; despite supposedly being situated at the middle of 
the philosophical spectrum. By pursuing the interview process in this manner, the possibility 
of the subjectivity of our respondents providing greater insight into phenomena is in practice 
treated as secondary to gaining information on this external reality.  
 Secondly, this bifurcation of interview practice appeared to discontinue the 
spontaneous, constructionist, and meaning-making aspects of the interview experience. We 
have borrowed an idea from Berger and Luckmann (1966) here ± as influential proponents of 
social constructionism ± in developing this point, who suggest that discontinuing the 
spontaneity of our social experience is required if we are to truly reflect upon our position in 
the social world. We argue, however, that in an interview research setting, the discontinuity 
related to abstracting ontology and subjectivity tends to devalue and break the instinctive, and 
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interactive nature of the interview as a conversational activity. As highlighted by Shotter 
(2010), we agree that an appreciation of the temporal dimension of interviews as 
conversations is necessary, meaning the interviewer and interviewee are jointly re-evaluating 
both their individual world and the social world in which it is situated. By ignoring this 
aspect of interview research we became inundated with our own abstract philosophical 
agenda, as opposed to a more reflexive sensitivity towards how the immediate interaction we 
share with our respondents can enrich our understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation. Our process of reflexivity is similar to the auto-ethnographic account of 
0F'RQDOG¶V  ZRUN RQ TXHHU UHIOH[LYLW\ As reflexivity asks us to question the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of the research process (Cunliffe, 2003), our 
paper corroborates McDonald (2013) in that (philosophical) identities are fluid and constantly 
evolving during the research process and that a priori philosophical perspectives in particular 
are as much open to this process of reflexivity when applied in practice.  
 As such, we follow Crotty (1998:58) in describing our emerging social 
FRQVWUXFWLRQLVWSRVLWLRQ7KDWLVWKHNQRZOHGJHFUHDWHGLQWKHLQWHUYLHZLQYROYHGDµFROOHFWLYH
JHQHUDWLRQ >DQG WUDQVPLVVLRQ@ RI PHDQLQJ¶ EHWZHHQ WKH LQWHUYLHZHU DQG LQWHUYLHZHH LQ WKe 
practical moment of the interview setting. The way in which our interviews appeared 
indicative of a social constructionist approach must be further clarified. Given that social 
constructionism opposes the notion of an objective ontological reality, the fact that our 
critical realist approach sought to take us outside of the interview made it appear that the 
interview setting itself was also objective to our human experience. By simply focusing on 
µacting¶ FULWLFDO UHDOLVW WKHUH ZDV D neglect for the importance of knowledge and meaning 
being constructed in the interview setting; such as the change in attitude towards the notion of 
µEUHDGZLQQHU¶LQRXUHDUOLHUH[DPSOH7KHshared interaction between us and our interviewees 
led to the construction of meaning and understanding. This follows Berger and Luckmann 
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(1966) in that the social world cannot be removed from the human activity that produces it. 
Therefore, if we understand the social world to be constructed in this way, engagement or 
questioning of that social world within our doctoral research is based on disbelief for any 
foundational objective truth. This requires a fundamental reset in how we view our 
philosophical endeavours, from one based on a single truth to one that understands and 
appreciates the multiple, subjective realities within the social world. 
Relatedly, the way in which critical realism denotes an epistemological relativism did 
not seem far removed from an appreciation of individual subjectivity within the social world. 
A further analysis of critical realism, however, highlights an important contradiction in the 
ZD\ NQRZOHGJH LV XQGHUVWRRG RWKHUZLVH WHUPHG DV WKH µUHDOLVWs¶ GLOHPPD¶ (Edwards et al, 
1995). That practicing critical realism made us realise how individuals jointly construct 
knowledge in the interview setting, suggests that our critical realist approach to interviewing 
was in fact reducible to the very social nature of such an interaction (Shotter, 1992). That is, 
the way we understood the ontological reality was because of the shared subjectivity between 
ourselves and the interviewees that constructed the view of the social world. Edwards et al 
GHVFULEHWKLVDVDIXQGDPHQWDOFULWLTXHRIUHDOLVWDSSURDFKHVVWDWLQJWKDWWKHµYHU\
act of producing a non-represented, unconstructed external world is inevitably 
representational, threatening, as soon as it is produced, to turn around upon and counter the 
YHU\ SRVLWLRQ LW LV PHDQW WR GHPRQVWUDWH¶ This was particularly so when applying critical 
realism in practice. Put simply, whilst we may feel confident in our position as qualitative 
researchers to make an informed analysis of the phenomena we study, using locally produced 
knowledge constructed in the interview in order to make broader claims about an ontological 
reality was discomfiting; especially given the ways in which meanings and interpretations of 
gender roles changed throughout the interviews themselves. 
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 In all, our initial philosophical approach proved inadequate in the practical moment of 
the interview setting. Whilst we approached the interview setting in a critical realist manner, 
upon reflection we have begun to understand qualitative interview practice in more social 
constructionist terms. As such, having a preconceived idea or guidelines about how we might 
enact a certain philosophy (critical realism) in practice was actually understood as a different 
one altogether (social constructionism). Additionally, the way that we have understood the 
application of philosophy to our methodological practice corroborates Ramsey¶V (2011) work 
on the relationship between academic theory and management practice, DQG µNQRZLQJ-in-
SUDFWLFH¶On reflection, we consider our use of critical realism to have essentially been used 
µSURYRFDWLYHO\¶5DPVH\ in order to stimulate and incite our understanding of how we 
may apply a philosophical perspective to methodological practice. That we began to 
understand the qualitative interview in social constructionist terms rather than a strict critical 
UHDOLVWDSSURDFKKLJKOLJKWVZKDW5DPVH\GHVFULEHVDVµVFKRODUVKLSRISUDFWLFH¶DV
doctoral students we have engaged with ideas, sought a practice of inquiry, and realised the 
moment-by-moment relating within practice. Thus, our use of critical realism within our 
interview method provoked an understanding of social constructionism when put into 
practice. Furthermore, our experiences also corroborate another point by Ramsey (2011), in 
that by emphasising a process of understanding of a specific philosophical perspective prior 
to application we may actually restrict the potential of alternative approaches to be realised 
GXULQJ WKH SURFHVV ,W ZDV QRW WKHQ WKDW RXU FULWLFDO UHDOLVW DSSURDFK µIDLOHG¶ EXW UDWKHU
applying this approach in practice brought into focus ideas and principles that were more 
social constructionist in nature. Therefore, we advocate that doctoral students use 
philosophical perspectives provocatively, but also reflexively, in informing their 
methodological practice in order to understand the different ways in which data can be 
collected but also analysed and interpreted.  
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Our analysis must be qualified, however, not as a direct slight on attempts to apply 
critical realism to qualitative interviewing as we discuss just one attempt at doing so (Smith 
and Elger, 2014). Indeed, there is the possibility that even the most cognitively skilled and 
meticulous researchers may be able to effectively bifurcate theoretical demands of ontology 
and subjectivity during an interview setting. We must be true to ourselves, though, that as 
doctoral students we inevitably experience struggles in developing and pursuing a consistent 
and coherent research design.  
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
 Through the auto-ethnographic narrative presented here of how we sought to 
understand the link between research philosophy and methodology we have demonstrated 
some of the struggles facing doctoral students doing research within a business school. Given 
the growing importance of applying philosophy to our research designs, this is just one 
account of an attempt to explicitly connect a chosen philosophical perspective (critical 
realism) to the qualitative interview method and our broader methodological concerns. Our 
narrative initially led us to an understanding of critical realism and then to question how we 
might apply this philosophical perspective to our methodological practice. Through 
attempting to align this with the work of Holstein and Gubrium (1995, 2011) and Miller and 
Glassner (2011) we felt that we had found a coherent approach that consistently linked our 
philosophical and methodological commitments. Having then used our critical realist 
approach in practice, we began to recognise the influence of social constructionism in the 
qualitative interview process as it was the interaction with our interview participants during 
the interview that constructed the meanings and understanding of the social phenomena under 
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investigation. So as not to rehash our earlier discussion, our use of critical realism to inform 
our qualitative interview practice proved both difficult and inadequate. 
$VPHQWLRQHG WU\LQJµWREH¶FULWLFDO UHDOLVW LQDQ LQWHUYLHZVHWWLQJ led to an approach 
that sought to isolate ontology and epistemology and as a consequence, disregarded the 
simultaneity and immediacy of the interview experience. Furthermore, so what of separating 
ontology and epistemology, when the critical realist method does little to help us then bring 
them back together so as to create a better understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation? This is again where we felt that the practice of qualitative interviewing was 
PRUH FRQGXFLYH WR FRQVWUXFWLRQLVW SULQFLSOHV DV WKH VXSSRVHG µHSLVWHPLFOLQJXLVWLF IDOODF\¶
was an unavoidable part of the conversational, interactional aspect of the interview process.  
It must be acknowledged though, that our initial goal was to try and develop a critical 
realist approach to qualitative interviewing and to share our experience of doing so. That we 
discovered the value of constructionist principles within that process does not imply we have 
tacitly developed an approach to interviewing based on social constructionism. Indeed, there 
is much writing that highlights the influence of social constructionism on qualitative 
interviewing (Borer and Fontana, 2012; Cunliffe, 2011; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; King and 
Horrocks, 2010; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009), with a paucity of critical realist application 
being developed in the same manner (Smith and Elger, 2014). Thus, we took it upon 
ourselves to analyse the work of Holstein & Gubrium (1995; 2011) and Miller and Glassner 
(2011) in a way that we hoped would demonstrate a consistency between our philosophical 
and methodological commitments.  
 Although this account highlights some of the issues in adopting critical realism to 
qualitative interviewing and research more generally, there is also a more valuable point to 
make. Instead, we were able to reflexively recognise the provocative role philosophical 
perspectives play in our research, by applying them in practice. As stated previously, that we 
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began to understand the constructionist elements of interview practice ± such as through 
challenging familial gender norms ± during our data collection, the way we conducted our 
interviews and our outcomes were necessarily influenced by this recognition. Perhaps, then, 
having a deterministic or a priori philosophical agenda is not vital. What we feel is an 
important contribution, however, is being aware of the reflexive and provocative nature of 
applying philosophy in practice, along with a greater understanding of the way that different 
views of the social world will impact and construct RQH¶VGDWDBetter still, we hope that by 
getting these thoughts down on paper we also reach out to doctoral students in a similar 
position. Our narrative account offers insights that we believe will resonate with the 
experiences of both our peers and also those interested in teaching and developing 
philosophically informed qualitative research. 7KDW VDLG RXU µMRXUQH\¶ in navigating 
philosophical perspectives continues, as we open up a debate about how experiences using 
philosophical perspectives in new and alternative ways leads to more insightful and 
meaningful qualitative data.  
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